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INCOMPATIBILITY AS A GROUND
FOR DIVORCE
GRAHAm KIRKPATRICK*

A. Hirtory
"Incompatibility" is defined by the Century Dictionaryas: "The
quality or condition of being incompatible; incongruity; irreconcilableness," and by Webster's New International Dictionary: "Quality or
state of being incompatible; inconsistency; incapable of harmonious
combination; incongruous; as incompatible colors; incapable of harmonious association or acting in accord; disagreeing as incompatible
persons." In Pope's Legal Definitions we find the following: "Incompatibility. The elements and qualities which create incompatibility between persons elude exact definition; so varied are the circumstances
and so dependent is such a state of feeling upon education, habits of
thought and perculiarities of character."
It is generally believed that incompatibility as a ground for divorce
is of recent origin. During the early years of the 19th century, legislatures in several states of the United States indicated an intention to
permit courts to grant divorces on grounds closely resembling incompatibility as we recognize it today.' In upholding the constitutionality
of a divorce statute, in 1839, the Indiana court said:
Like all discretionary power in Courts, it must be exercised
in a sound and legal manner; it must not be governed by caprice
or prejudice, or wild and visionary notions with regard to the
marriage institution, but should be so directed as to conduce to
domestic harmony, and the peace and morality of society. It
must be conformable
to the common sense and feeling of the
2
community.
The above statute was obviously broad enough in its scope, to
authorize the court in its discretion to grant a divorce where the
differences between the parties had become irreconcilable and had
completely destroyed domestic peace and harmony. This statute has
long ago been repealed.
In 1857, the Supreme Court of Iowa had before it for decision a
divorce case 3 in which the court said:
* B.S., United States Military Academy; LL.B., 1951, University of Alabama Law
School; Associate Professor of Law, Tulsa University Law School.
' As early as 1831, the Revised Code of Indiana, after enumerating specific
grounds for divorce, enacted that the circuit courts shall have power to grant
divorces "for any other cause, and in any other case, where the Court, in
their discretion, shall consider it reasonable and proper that a divorce should
be granted."
2 Ritter v. Ritter, 5 Blackf. 81, 83 (Ind. 1839).
3 Inskeep v. Inskeep, 5 Iowa 204 (1857). The second ground relied upon by
the plaintiff for divorce was that "she and the said defendant cannot live in
peace and harmony together, and that their welfare requires their separation."
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The Code (Sec. 1482) provides that a divorce from the
bonds of matrimony may be decreed, when these things are made
fully apparent to the court. And in considering the provision,
we remark in the first place, that it must be made fully apparent
to the court, not only that the parties cannot live in peace and
happiness together, but also that their welfare requires their
separation. As a general rule, it will doubtless be found, that if
the parties to the marriage relation cannot continue therein in
peace and happiness, their welfare would be promoted by a
separation.... The court is to consider their moral, their social,
and their mental well being....
We also understand that this section of the Code does not
have reference to the temporary peace and happiness of the
parties, nor to their temporary welfare, but it was designed, by
the legislature that the chancellor should have regard to their
permanent-their general peace, happiness, and welfare ...
And, again, a divorce is not to be decreed, for this cause, to
the wrong-doer.4
The above closely outlines a divorce for incompatibility as recognized in a few jurisdictions today. One difference is that, today, courts
do not hestitate to grant a divorce to the wrong-doer, where incompatibility is alleged. This statute has long been repealed.
In 1896, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, considered
a petition for divorce,5 pursuant to the provisions of a statute which
provided for a divorce on the application of either party for any other
cause deemed sufficient, where the court "shall be satisfied that the
parties can no longer live together."6 Said the court:
We do not think it was intended by the legislature that a
divorce should be granted in every case wherein it should be
found "that the parties can no longer live together ;" and where,
as here, their failure to live together is due to their own obstinacy and stubborness, we think a divorce should be denied.
It is not the policy of the law that divorces should be granted
merely because parties, "from unruly temper," or mutual wranglings, live unhappily together. In order to have relief, it is not
required that the party complaining should be wholly without
fault, for the law recognizes the weakness of human nature, and
measures the conduct of the parties by the standard of common
experience. But "where the parties to a divorce suit are in pari
delicto, the conduct of each being a constant aggravation to
further offense by the other,
no divorce will be granted at the
'
17"1
instance of either party.

The Washington statute construed above, was undoubtedly broad
enough to permit a divorce on grounds closely resembling incompatibility, as we have it today. However, in 1896, the Washington court
4Id. at 212.
5 Colvin v. Colvin, 15 Wash. 490, 46 Pac. 1029 (1896).
6 2 Hsu-S CODE §764(7).
7Colvin v. Colvin, supra note 5, at 492, 46 Pac. at 1030.
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was not quite ready to go all the way, and by construction read into
the statute obstacles probably not contemplated by the legislature. This
statute was repealed in 1921.
Incompatibility as a ground for divorce, existed in Denmark during
the 18th century.8 In Denmark, after 1790, divorce became more frequent, and was given on new grounds, among which was irremediable
disharmony in the common life.
Prior to their acquisition by the United States in 1917, the Virgin
Islands, as a part of Denmark, were subject to Danish law. Incompatibility of temperment was one of the grounds for divorce recognized
in the Virgin Islands in the Code of Laws of the Municipality of
St. Thomas and St. John, as originally enacted by the Colonial Council
of the Municipality in 1921," and it was carried over into the Divorce
Law enacted by the Legislative Assembly in 1944.
Thus, it will be seen that incompatibility as the ground for divorce
is recognized today, and having its beginning in Danish law, was first
introduced into the United States in the Virgin Islands, which became
a United States Possession by purchase from Denmark. In 1933, New
Mexico adopted incompatibility as a ground for divorce, 10 followed by
Alaska in 1935,11 and Oklahoma in 1953.12 As a result, during the first
half of the 20th century we find four American jurisdictions, in borrowing from Danish law, adopting as a ground for divorce essentially
what may well have been intended by the legislatures of Indiana,
Illinois, Iowa and Washington during the 19th century.
B. It Actual Application
In 1952, the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, considered a case from the Virgin Islands, 3 wherein the plaintiff sought a
divorce on the ground of incompatibility of temperament. Said the
court:
We conclude that while incompatibility of temperament in
the Virgin Islands Divorce Law does not refer to those petty
quarrels and minor bickerings which are but the evidence of
that frailty which all humanity is heir to, it unquestionably does
refer to conflicts in personalities and dispositions so deep as to
be irreconcilable and to render it impossible for the parties to
continue a normal marital relationship with each other. To use
the ancient Danish phrase, the disharmony of the spouses in
their common life must be so deep and intense as to be irremediable. It is the legal recognition of the proposition long established in the earlier Danish law of the Islands that if the
8

Burch v. Burch, 195 F. 2d 799, 805 (3d Cir. 1952).
9 CODE ST. THmo., ST. JOHN tit. III, ch. 44, §7(8)..
10 Laws of N.M. 1933, ch. 54 at 71.
11 Sess. Laws of Alaska 1935, ch. 54, at 120.
12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §1271 (1953).
13 Burch v. Burch, supra note 8.
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parties are so mismated that their marriage has in fact ended
as the result of their hopeless disagreement and discord the
courts should be empowered to terminate it as a matter of law.
As we have already pointed out, incompatibility of temperament necessarily involves both parties so that in a very real
sense the incompatible temperament of each party has deprived
the other of a normal marital relationship.14
Burch v. Burch, 15 although of relatively recent origin, having been
decided in 1952, has acquired the status of a leading case. Where incompatibility is relied upon as a ground for divorce, most likely, it
will be found that courts in New Mexico, Oklahoma and Alaska, will
cite it as authority to support their views. Such being the case, let us
see what standards, if any, the case supplies for measuring incompatibility. The standards are in general terms. There is nothing as concrete
as the requirement in case of cruelty, that there must be "reasonable
apprehension of grievous bodily harm or death."
Burch v. Burch'6 tells us that the conflict in personalities and dispositions must be so deep as to be irreconcilable and to render it impossible for the parties to continue a normal marital relationship. The
question immediately arises, what acts of the parties will be held to establish such conditions? The case is not of much aid in answering this
question. Nor, in fact, are later cases elsewhere. The determination of
whether or not incompatibility exists is generally left to the discretion
of the trial judge, and can easily lead to a lack of uniformity in decisions. Judge X, a teetotaler, may consider the fact that a husband
taking a few drinks with the boys, where the wife abhors strong drink
in any form or degree, even in moderation, causes a conflict in personalities so deep as to be irreconcilable. On the other hand, Judge Y,
who delights in an occasional highball, most likely will consider the
circumstances to be merely a petty quarrel and minor bickering, which
do not qualify as incompatibility justifying divorce. Courts will render
a real service if, in the future, they make a conscious effort in the
cases to establish standards as to what conduct amounts to incompatability, and what falls short of that ground.
The Burch case tells us that incompatibility must necessarily involve both parties. "If there is a clash of personalities, both must
clash."' 7 The court takes the position that even though one of the
spouses may be largely responsible for the acts creating the incompatibility in the other, nevertheless it is inconceivable that one partner's
temperament can be compatible with the other, if the other is incompatible with him or her. In effect the court says that if John feels in14 Id.
15

at 806-807, 811.
Note 8 supra.

16 Ibid.

17Id. at 808.
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compatible with Mary, it must follow as a necessary consequence that
Mary must be incompatible with John. Such is not necessarily true.
The courts of New Mexico, are in agreement with Burch case
8
as to what constitutes incompatibility. In the case of Poteet v. Poteet,2
the court indicated that irreconcilableness of the parties is an important
factor to be considered in determining whether to grant a divorce on
the ground of incompatibility. In Bassett v. Bassett,19 the court said:
one ground of divorce, and that most commonly used, is
"incompatibility." Either spouse may bring a divorce in New
Mexico on the ground of incompatibility and may secure a
divorce upon such grounds without allowing or proving that the
defendant is in any way guilty of any misconduct or is responsible
for, or that his conduct or actions created such state of incompatibility.... That is, it is not incumbent upon the plaintiff who
brings the divorce proceeding upon the ground of incompatibility
to show any misconduct or guilt against the defendant but it is
only incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish by the evidence
that a state of incompatibility exists regardless of whether it is
anyone's or no one's fault.20
Obviously, the rule set forth above is in conflict with the doctrine
that there can be no divorce where the defendant is free from fault, as
applicable where the grounds relied upon are other than incompatibility.
Courts in New Mexico, as do those in the Virgin Islands, obviously
subscribe to the doctrine that, where one spouse feels incompatible as
to the other, such other is as a matter of law incompatible as to his or
her partner, even though such spouse may entertain no feelings of incompatibility whatever towards the other.
Likewise, Alaskan courts follow the principles set forth in Burch
v. Burch.:"
In Oklahoma today, the principles of the Burch case prevail. However, Oklahoma courts encountered more difficulty than those of New
Mexico and Alaska in reaching this conclusion. In 1956, three years
after incompatibility became a ground for divorce,2 2 the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma decided the case of Chappell v. Chappell.2 3 The court said:
when incompatibility is the grounds for a divorce ...
It should not be grounds for divorce where only one of the parties
to a marriage is incompatible. Incompatibility is a two way
proposition and should not be applicable where the party seeking
the divorce is the only one who is incompatible. Our statute did
not intend to mean that anyone could obtain a divorce on this
ground merely because a divorce was desired. In all such cases
N.M. 214, 114 P. 2d 91 (1941).
N.M. 739, 250 P. 2d 487 (1952).
20 Id. at 747, 250 P. 2d at 495.
21 Note 8 supra.
22 Note 12 supra.
23 298 P. 2d 768, 58 A.L.R. 2d 1214 (Okla. 1956).
1845
29 56
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there must be some
conduct creating incompatibility on the part
2 4
of the defendant.

This doctrine is diametrically opposed to principles enunciated in
Burch and followed in the Virgin Islands, New Mexico and Alaska.
The Oklahoma court permitted the rule of Chappell to stand for only
three years. In 1959, in the case of Rakestraw v. Rakestraw, 25 the court
said:
There is little evidence in the record to explain, or indicate
in what way, if any, defendant contributed to the regrettable
and 'scrambled' domestic situation in which the parties involved
and their innocent children now find themselves. Without describing this in detail, it is sufficient to say that plaintiff appears
to be largely, if not entirely, responsible for it....

Despite any

inference defense counsel draws from previous expressions of
this court to the effect that one spouse may be incompatible without the other spouse also being incompatible and contributing to
the state of incompatibility existing between them (see Chappell
v. Chappell, Okl. 298 P. 2d 768, 771, 58 A.L.R. 2d 1214), we
think there can be no dissent to the statement ... that: 'Incompatibility is a two way proposition ....
Applicable alike to the

general subject of incompatibility are the statements of the Court
in Burch v. Burch, 3 Cir., 195 F. 2d 799, 808, with reference to
'incompatibility of temperament,' as follows: 'While one spouse
may have a more normal temperament than the other and the
overt acts evidencing incompatibility may come largely from the
other spouse, it is inconceivable that a husband's temperament
can be compatible with that of his wife if hers is incompatible
with his. If there is a clash of personalities both must clash. 26
Thus, Oklahoma capitulated to the doctrine of the Burch v. Burch
case.
We have discussed rules applicable to those jurisdictions where
incompatibility is a statutory ground for divorce. A close reading of
cases in other jurisdictions will reveal that in reality incompatibility
is available as a ground for divorce, under a different name. For example, in Pennsylvania, a divorce may be granted for "indignities to
the person." In the case of Dearth v. Dearth,2 7 in describing the conduct which may constitute "indignities to the person," the Pennsylvania
court said:
The course of conduct amounting to such indignities as would
justify a divorce is apparently incapable of specific or of exact
definition. Each case must necessarily depend upon its own facts
... It is well settled, however, that it is not with isolated ocurrences that the law concerns itself in determining whether a
divorce should be granted upon this ground, but only with in24

Id. at 771.

25345 P. 2d 888 (Okla. 1959).

2 Id. at 890.
27 141 Pa. Super. 344, 15 A. 2d 37 (1940).
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dignities so repeated and continuous as to constitute a course
of conduct which renders the complaining party's condition intolerable and life itself a burden. Such indignities we have frequently said may consist of vulgarity, unmerited reproach,
habitual contumely, studied neglect, intentional incivility, manifest disdain, abusive language, malignant ridicule, and every
other plain manifestation of settled hate and estrangement; but
slight or irregular acts of misconduct are not sufficient. .... 28
There can be little doubt that in every case of incompatibility filed
in the Virgin Islands, New Mexico, Alaska, or Oklahoma, the plaintiff
has relied upon one or more of the "indignities to the person" set forth
above to prove incompatibility. Also, it may be said that the existence
of one or more of the indignities listed above may well cause one or
more marital partners to conclude that conflicts in their personalities
exist which are so deep as to be irremediable, and to render it impossible
to continue a normal marital relation. May it be said that in fact "incompatibility" exists as a ground for divorce in Pennsylvania, under
the name of "indignities to the person" ?
Let us review the Utah case of Hendricks v. Hendricks.2 9 This case
concludes that where the marriage is hopelessly on the rocks and the
marriage relationship has become so intolerable that both would be
happier if they were free to go their separate ways, no good purpose,
either social, moral, ethical or legal, could be served by refusing to
grant a divorce and settle the property rights of the parties. These ideas
were repeated in the case of

Wilsol.

v. Wilson. 30 In the Hendricks case,

the court used the reasoning enumerated above in refusing to apply the
doctrine of "recrimination," where the parties were in equal fault. Instead, the doctrine of "comparative rectitude," was applied, and a
divorce granted to the party least at fault, upon the existence of circumstances which would be held to be incompatibility in jurisdictions
recognizing such ground for divorce.
In other jurisdictions, courts sometimes lean over backwards to
hold that profane and obscene language on the part of one spouse
against the other, or against the wishes of the other, is cruelty within
the meaning of the existing statute.31 Actually, these courts are merely
reading into the word "cruelty," that which is incompatibility in the
Virgin Islands, New Mexico, Alaska and Oklahoma.
By the same token, courts in some jurisdictions go to great length
to stretch the words "mental cruelty" to include within their meaning
the elements of incompatibility. Indifference, neglect, contempt, nag28 Id. at 348, 15 A. 2d at 41.

P. 2d 366 (1956).
Utah 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977 (1956).
osher v. Mosher, 16 N.D. 269, 113 N.W. 99, 12 L.R.A. (n.s.) 820, 125 Am.

29257
30 5

31

St. Rep. 654 (1907); Wirthman v. Wirthman, 225 Mo. App. 692, 39 S.W. 2d
404 (1931) ; Jacintho v. Jacintho, 32 Hawaii 907 (1934) ; Koehler v. Koehler,
137 Ark. 302, 209 S.W. 283 (1919).
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ging, acts showing aversion to a spouse, the habitual occurrence of
which serve as a basis for establishing incompatibility, where such
ground for divorce is recognized, are in other jurisdictions recognized as grounds for divorce, under the guise of "mental cruelty." 32
In the case of Morris v. Morris,33 the Georgia court said:
Mental anguish, wounded feelings, constantly aggravated by
repeated insults and neglect, are as bad as actual bruises of the
person; and that which produces the one, is not more cruel than
that which causes the other.
In Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 34 the trial court said:
From the days of Socrates and Xantippe, men and women
have known what is meant by nagging, although philology cannot define it or legal chemistry resolve it into its elements. Humor
cannot soften or wit divert it. Prayers avail nothing, and threats
are idle. Soft words but increase its velocity, and harsh ones
its violence. Darkness has for it no terrors, and the long hours
of the night draw no drapery of the couch around it. The chamber
where love and peace should dwell becomes an inferno, driving
the poor man to the saloon, the rich one to the club, and both to
the arms of the harlot. It takes the sparkle out of the wine of
life,3 5and turns at night into ashes the fruits of the labor of the
day

The learned Georgia judges have merely said above that nagging
is mental cruelty justifying divorce. Under similar circumstances,
judges in the Virgin Islands, New Mexico, Alaska and Oklahoma
say nagging breeds such incompatibility as to be a ground for divorce.
The circumstances complained of are the same, the results are the
same; the only difference is that, in Georgia, nagging is labeled mental
cruelty, and in Oklahoma, incompatibility. Numerous other cases could
be cited, but it is believed that we have discussed a sufficient number to
support the earlier statement that where incompatibility as a ground for
divorce is not authorized by statute, it nevertheless exists under other
labels, such as "indignities to the person," "cruelty," "mental cruelty,"
or what have you.
C. Recrimination and Comparative Rectitude as Defenses
In most jurisdictions within the United States, it is well settled that
where both spouses are guilty of acts which are grounds for divorce,
under the doctrine of recrimination, the court should deny a divorce to
either. This is merely an application of the equitable rule that one who
32 Hooe v. Hooe, 122 Ky. 590, 92 S.W. 317, 5 L.R.A. (n.s.) 729, 13 Ann. Cas.
214 (1906); Sabot v. Sabot, 97 Wash. 395, 166 Pac. 624 (1917); Brown v.
Brown, 130 Neb. 487, 265 N.W. 556 (1936); Zuerrer v. Zuerrer, 238 Iowa
402, 27 N.W. 2d 260 (1947) ; Thompson v. Thompson, 227 Minn. 256, 35 N.W.
2d 289 (1948).
33202 Ga. 431, 43 S.E. 2d 639 (1947).
34 159 Ga. 332, 125 S.E. 856 (1924).
5 Id. at 335, 125 S.E. at 859.
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invokes the aid of a court must come into court with a clear conscience
and clean hands. In some jurisdictions, the doctrine of recrimination
is modified to become the doctrine of comparative rectitude under which,
where both parties are guilty of acts which are grounds for divorce,
the divorce will be granted to the one least at fault.
In the case of Chavez v. Chavez,36 decided by the New Mexico
court in 1935, in a case where some ground other than incompatibility
was relied upon for divorce, the court held that it is the imperative duty
of the Chancellor to deny a divorce upon a showing of recrimination.
37
In 1946, the same court, in the case of Pavletich v. Pavletich,
wherein' incompatibility was the ground relied upon, and where there
was a showing of recrimination, overruled Chavez v. Chavez insofar
as that case held it to be the imperative duty of the Chancellor to deny
a divorce upon a showing of recrimination.
In 1950, in the case of Clark v. Clark,3 8 the New Mexico court reexamined its decision in the Pavletich case, and modified the rule of
that case in deciding that where plaintiff seeks a divorce on the ground
of incompatibility, it is discretionary with the court, after hearing the
evidence establishing a recriminatory offense or offenses rather than
incompatibility, whether he will or will not grant the divorce. Where
incompatibility is relied upon as the ground for divorce, incompatibility
may not be pleaded by way of recrimination.
Prior to the Clark case, in 1950, the doctrine of comparative rectitude
had no place in New Mexico, where incompatibility was relied upon.
Since the Clark case, the court, in exercising its discretion where incompatibility is alleged, and both parties are guilty of acts which are
grounds for divorce other than incompatibility, may grant a divorce to
the spouse least at fault.
In the case of Burch v. Burch, the court considered whether recrimination or comparative rectitude were recognized as defenses in
divorce actions in the Virgin Islands, where incompatibility was the
ground alleged. It was held that recrimination is not a bar to divorce
except where expressly authorized by statute. The codes which the
Colonial Council of the Municipality in the Virgin Islands adopted in
1920 and 1921,40 authorize the defense of recrimination where a plaintiff, seeking a divorce on the ground of adultery, is shown to have also
committed adultery. In no other case is recrimination a defense. The
doctrine of comparative rectitude is not recognized in the Virgin
Islands.

41

N.M. 480, 50 P. 2d 264, 101 A.L.R. 635 (1935).
N.M. 224, 174 P. 2d 826 (1946).
3854 N.M. 364, 225 P. 2d 147, 21 A.L.R. 2d 1263 (1950).
39 Burch v. Burch, supra note 8.
40 Note 9 supra, §10.
41 Note 8 supra.
3639

3750
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In Alaska, the defense of recrimination is recognized only where
plaintiff sues for divorce on the ground of adultery, and defendant
shows the plaintiff to be also guilty of adultery.42 Thus, where incompatibility is the ground relied upon, recrimination is no defense. The
doctrine of comparative rectitude has no application in Alaska.
In Oklahoma, a statute provides as follows: "That the parties appear to be in equal wrong shall not be a basis for refusing to grant a
divorce, but if a divorce is granted in such circumstances, it shall be
granted to both parties. '' 43 In construing this statute, the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma has said:
* * * we see in our Statute's 1955 amendment directing that
where parties in equal wrong are divorced, the divorce be granted
to both, no proscription against a divorce being granted, in like
manner, where the parties' 'wrong' is not 'equal,' or where one
may be more at fault than the other. We therefore hold that there
is no reason why that cannot be done in this jurisdiction. ... 44
Thus, it will be seen that, in Oklahoma, by statute, it is discretionary
with the court whether or not to apply the doctrine of recrimination.
The only restriction upon the court's discretion is that, if a divorce be
granted, it must be granted to both parties. The same discretion will
permit the court to apply the doctrine of comparative rectitude in an
appropriate case.
D. Remarks
We may safely assume that in no jurisdiction, did the legislative
body in adopting incompatibility as a ground for divorce, intend that
this ground should be used to make possible trial marriages. No further
authority for this statement is needed than the fact that states which
have made incompatibility a ground for divorce, as do other states, announce that it is the public policy of these states to encourage the
permanency of marriage, and to discourage divorce. However, a close
reading of cases wherein divorces have actually been granted on the
ground of incompatibility, may lead one to wonder if in fact all that
is required to secure a dissolution of the marriage on the ground of
incompatibility is to show that one spouse has in fact grown tired of
the other. How do some judges view this ground? Justice Hudspeth,
of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, in his concurring opinion in the
case of Chavez v. Chavez, 45 referring to incompatibility as a ground for
divorce said: "When the Legislature wrote this additional ground of
divorce into our law, they intended to afford a remedy for a spouse
incompatible with his or her mate, and that too without regard to the
42 Comp. Laws of Terr. of Alaska 1913, tit. XIII, Code of Civ. Proc. §1302.
43

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.

12, §1275.

4 Rakestraw v. Rakestraw, supra note 25, at 890.
4 Note 36 supra.
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wishes of the other spouse, or the fact that the other spouse might have
46
a ground for divorce."
An invaluable contribution can be made tb the permanency of the
marital relation, if judges will carefully examine the trend to consider
petty quarrels and minor bickerings as showing incompatibility justifying divorce, and confine divorces on the ground of incompatibility only
to those cases where, to use the ancient Danish phrase, "the disharmony
of the spouses in their common life is so deep and intense as to be
irremediable."
For many years, reasonable apprehension of serious impairment of
health, grievous bodily harm, or death, has been applied as a standard
in determining whether acts alleged as cruelty are of sufficient gravity
as to justify divorce. Is there any real obstacle in the way of applying
the same standards to acts relied upon to establish incompatibility?
Statutes making cruelty a ground for divorce generally do not define
the term. The standard above mentioned generally arises from court
construction of the cruelty statutes. By the same token, statutes making
incompatibility a ground for divorce, do not define the term. There is
no reason why courts in construing these statutes may not read into
them the same standards, if they truly wish to make effective the public
policy of the state to encourage the permanency of the marital relation,
and discourage divorce.
In those states wherein incompatibility has been adopted as a
ground for divorce, the legislatures may well consider abolishing all
other grounds, without depriving anyone of a divorce now available in
those states. After all, what is the net result of showing cruelty which
places one in reasonable apprehension of grievous bodily harm? It is
simple to show that the parties are in fact incompatible. Also, what does
a plaintiff really prove when she successfully convinces the court that
the defendant husband is guilty of gross neglect of marital duties? She
in fact proves that she is incompatible with her husband. Where insanity of the other spouse is successfully established as the ground for
divorce, in reality it is established that the successful plaintiff is incompatible with the insane defendant. Should incompatibility remain
as the only ground for divorce, as suggested, untold time and effort
would be saved lawyers and courts, both trial and appellate, of arguing
the other grounds thus eliminated. It is respectfully recommended that
legislatures in states where incompatibility exists as a ground for divorce give serious consideration to adopting the above suggestion.
It is also suggested that in those states where incompatibility has
not yet been adopted as a ground for divorce that legislatures refrain
from so amending existing statutes. In these states, with the possible
exception of New York, any husband or wife who truly, and without
41 Id. at 268.

464
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subterfuge and perjury, are subjected to conditions making further
cohabitation as husband and wife inadvisable, can secure a divorce on
grounds already available. To add incompatibility to existing grounds
is but the first step in the direction of making even more insecure the
already existing insecurity of the marital relation prevalent throughout
our society.

